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HOME-SCHOOL AGREEMENTS: ON THE GROWTH OF 
JURIDIFICATION AND CONTRACTUALISM IN SCHOOLS 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since 1998 all maintained schools, academies and city technology colleges in 
England and Wales have been required to publish a home-school agreement (School 
Standards and Framework Act, 1998). The Department for Education describes it as 
a statement explaining ‘the school’s aims and values’, ‘the school’s responsibilities 
towards its pupils’, ‘the responsibility of each pupil’s parents’ and ‘what the school 
expects of its pupils’ (DfE, 2013, p.1). Its content is the formal responsibility of the 
governing body but, ‘before adopting or revisiting a home-school agreement, ‘all 
parents of registered pupils at the school must be consulted’ and ‘schools must 
review the agreement from time to time’ (ibid. p.1). In practice the agreement is 
tripartite involving schools, parents and pupils. It will vary in content from school to 
school depending upon the outcome of consultation but pupils will often end up 
signing a promise to ‘take care of other people’s belongings’, for example, parents to 
‘get our child to school on time’ and schools to ‘provide a happy and secure learning 
environment’. Agreements differ from ‘parenting contracts’ that are imposed by a 
court to secure ‘an improvement in the child’s attendance and behaviour’ (DfE, 
2012), but both are contractual in nature for they make explicit what the various 
parties have signed up to and imply there would be recrimination, legal or otherwise, 
should there be deviance (see Bastiani, 1996, p. 9; Norman Waterhouse Lawyers, 
2004). 
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The agreement came into being during Prime Minister Blair’s administration as part 
of a wider offensive on irresponsible parents. Their flagship policy Every Parent 
Matters suggested that ‘parents unwilling to accept help and fulfil their 
responsibilities must be compelled to do so’ (DfES, 2007, para. 4.28). This 
‘responsibilisation agenda’ (see Ball, 2009) became progressively more strident 
towards the end of the decade so that by June 2009 the Secretary of State for 
Children, Schools and Families was warning: ‘Once their child is in school, the 
parents will be expected to sign the agreement each year and will face real 
consequences if they fail to live up to the responsibilities set out within it, including 
the possibility of a court-imposed parenting order’ (DCSF, 2009, p. 3 my italics; see 
also Gibson & Simon, 2010). While such a threat is indicative of the political 
backdrop to the formation of agreements it amounted to no more than ministerial 
bravado, for the parental and pupil signature has remained voluntary till this day and 
without legal teeth: ‘Any breach of the agreement will not be actionable through the 
courts; no pupil can be excluded because a parent refuses to sign the agreement; no 
pupil can be refused a place because a parent refuses to sign’ (ISCG, 2007, p. 142).  
 
Research on home-school agreements is sparse, dated and in some cases 
insufficiently interpretative. Blair and Waddingtons’ study of the legal consequences 
of contracting with parents concluded: ‘The rhetoric of choice and partnership is 
used as a smoke screen for control and discipline and the imposition of a model of 
‘good parent’ is being superimposed over the ordinary obligations that all parents 
share’ (1997, p. 30; see also Crawford, 2003). Vincent and Tomlinson argued that 
‘contracts have become… a mechanism for enforcing school discipline’ and ‘contain 
an inherent social class bias’ (1997, p. 369; see also Vincent, 2012). In 1999 Hood 
suggested that home-school agreements were underpinned by implicit and dubious 
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models of parents as ‘problems’ and as ‘consumers’ (Hood, 1999, p. 427) and her 
identically named paper two years later lent ‘little support to the government’s view 
that home-school agreements w[ould] provide a framework for improved 
partnership between parents and schools’ (Hood, 2001, p. 7). In contrast, from a 
limited survey of agreements in inner-city schools, Sykes concluded that ‘parents and 
children overwhelmingly expressed that they thought home-school agreements were 
useful and helped to enhance trust’ (Sykes 2001, p. 273). Such a conclusion is 
contestable, however, in the light of evidence from Coldwell and colleagues in 2003 
whose investigation of 360 schools found that ‘in almost all cases, the parents 
interviewed had a very low level of awareness of the home-school agreement’ (DfES, 
2003, p. 81). In essence the corpus on agreements is limited in extent and by its 
explanation of the broader cultural and political backdrop to their rise. 
 
This paper tries to do four things. First, to explain tensions in the nature of a 
statutory requirement for schools to obtain non-obligatory signatures from parents 
and pupils; to raise questions regarding the evident asymmetry between parties in 
the construction, implementation and consequences of the agreement; and to query 
the authority and capability of pupils as young as four to challenge the content of an 
agreement or presume their loyalty to it. Second, it presents evidence of the 
procedures, practices and attitudes towards the agreement emerging from recent 
interview data with headteachers, teachers, pupil, governors and parents in four 
maintained schools. Their narratives and explanations are rich and detailed but 
limited space here involves abridgment. Third, it tries to show how the agreement 
signifies the emergence of new forms of interaction and relationships in schools that 
symbolise a shift in cultural practice. Here the paper draws upon Habermas’s 
concept of ‘juridification’ that describes the expansion of explicit and written formal 
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law in modern societies (Habermas, 2006) and implies that juridification can help 
explain how agreements do not merely supplement socially integrated contexts but 
herald their conversion to the medium of law. The forth section questions 
assumptions of subjectivity that underpin agreements by reference to social contract 
theory (Hobbes, 2008). It critiques contractarianism insofar as it encapsulates the 
way formal agreements symbolise the cool, distanced relationships between fearful 
strangers that disregard, and would displace, the web of trust that tie moral agents to 
one another in a multitude of complex and composite ways. 
 
 
2. CURRENT PRACTICE 
 
2.2. Methodology and method  
 
Two primary and two secondary schools were selected for their institutional 
differences but demographic proximity. All were in the west of England:  
Voluntary Controlled Primary (school A: 175 pupils, 4-11 year old)  
Roman Catholic Primary (school B: 200 pupils, 4-11 year olds)  
Secondary Community College (school C: 1190 pupils, 1-16 year olds)  
Secondary Academy (school D: 630 pupils, 11-18 year olds)  
In total forty-three interviews were carried out mostly individually. This included 128 
pupils in groups (Pu) , 8 parents (Par), 8 teachers (T), 3 Headteachers (HT), 1 Vice 
Principal (VP) and 5 members of Governing Bodies (GB), including 3 Chairpersons 
(CGB). Interviews were semi-structured, lasted from thirty minutes to an hour and 
were audio recorded. These were transcribed and scrutinised for dominant themes. 
Categorisation of these themes centred on the three groups of agreement signatories, 
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viz. the school (headteachers, governors, teachers), parents and pupils. Qualitative 
analysis involved inductive coding by sifting the content of the interviews for key 
discursive themes. These were formed in part by the questions asked but also as a 
result of the two-way flow of conversation and respondents’ reactions to 
supplementary questioning. Once these were identified, transcripts were scrutinised 
more systematically in order to classify similar and consistent responses from across 
the whole sample. Responses were then used to form sub-headings and paragraph 
themes and interviewees’ verbatim responses incorporated where poignant to 
capture the richness and tenor of their utterances. 
 
2.2. Schools’ perspective 
 
A number of core themes emerged from interviews with school officials. The first is 
that whereas headteachers and senior managers knew about the legal requirements 
for agreements, governors were often unsure about whether pupils and parents had a 
choice to sign or even if their school had an agreement: ‘I don’t know legally what 
the…’ (B-GB); ‘I don’t know if the Academy has one. I assume that they do. I would 
need to double check that’ (D-CGB). Teachers were aware of the home-school 
agreement but, like governors, were also unsure of its legal status. Knowledge of the 
procedures for the construction, revision and monitoring of the agreement was often 
vague. We have already seen how current legislation entitles parents to be co-
constructors and yet this did not happen in any of the four schools except indirectly 
through representation on governing bodies. None of the home-school agreements 
had ever been revised or updated since ratification and therefore failed to reflect the 
new annual intake of pupils or parents and their wishes, despite the rather 
amorphous statutory requirement to do this ‘from time to time’. When asked why, 
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one governor replied: ‘No… No… (laughter)… Although it’s a legal requirement we’ve 
never had to act on it. It’s never been an issue’ (B-GB). Thus while schools are 
currently obliged to take ‘reasonable steps to ensure the parental declaration is 
signed’, the monitoring of this was cursory despite pressure to do so within the first 
weeks of the academic year.  
 
The majority of teachers interviewed were dismissive of the agreement but were 
under pressure from senior managers to enact the policy. One Reception teacher 
argued:  
The agreement is not ‘agreed’ by children. We just get them to sign it. I 
personally would say it’s not that valuable.  
So why do it?  
Because it’s a legal requirement. I wouldn’t do it if we didn’t have to. (A-T) 
One who was more favourably disposed to home-school agreements tried to justify 
its lack of co-construction and revalidation by parents and pupils by arguing: ‘But it 
is an agreement if they (i.e. the parents and pupils) agree to it’ (B-T). School staff 
who oversaw the management of home-school agreements divided into two camps. 
On one hand were those who intentionally minimising their time and effort upon it, 
seeing it as an imposition and superfluous to their functioning as an institution (A, B 
& D). On the other was one vice-principal (C-VP) who justified its worth insofar as it 
could be used as a fillip to enact other school policies. Teachers entrusted with 
securing parents’ and pupils’ signatures likewise fell into these camps. There were 
those who were pragmatic in ‘getting it done and dusted’, as one put it, and those 
who saw it as functional insofar as it formed the basis of rules for parental or pupil 
behaviour and was therefore expedient to the school. School governors also vacillated 
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between these two positions, for while none spoke enthusiastically of the agreement 
one concluded:  
It is only the school that has any real interest, a statutory one in making sure it 
has one made. It’s not really on anyone else’s agenda to have one. It could be if 
there was a better engagement with the notion of it and a more widespread 
understanding of ‘agreement’ (D-GB). 
 
In sum, schools lived pragmatically with the statutory requirement and managed it at 
least cost so that the procedural aspects of completing the agreement and acquiring 
signatures was performed without generating undue tension or overt surveillance. 
While one senior school manager (C-VP) valued it explicitly this was not for reasons 
of partnerships with parents and pupils but for expediency in implementing other 
school policies. Moreover, it belied the lack of monitoring or awareness of teachers 
obliged to implement it and who were critical or dubious of its value. The other three 
schools clearly saw it as a procedural necessity (‘ticking boxes’) and suggested that 
there were far more constructive and positive ways of establishing relationships with 
parents and pupils. It is a snapshot of schools’ attitudes to the home-school 
agreement that correspond well with recent comments from OFSTED: 
Home-school agreements had a low profile and their impact on the day-to-day 
work between parents and the schools was very limited…  Although one 
secondary school considered that a signing event of the home–school 
agreement each September created a ‘common understanding’ between home 
and school, the headteachers of fewer than half the schools visited considered 
that this was an important document for their school. They did not see it as 
driving the school’s work with parents and it was seen by some as tokenistic. 
(OFSTED, 2011, p. 5 and 8) 
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What OFSTED does not offer, however, is an interpretation of broader issues 
concerning levels of mutuality, the autonomy and power of school actors or questions 
concerning the maintenance of loyalty and trust in schools, nor, indeed, an 
interpretation of the political assumptions that maintain the legal requirement for 
home-school agreements to this day. We come to these issues later. 
 
2.3. Parents’ perspective 
 
The first theme that emerged from parent interviews was a general sensitivity to the 
school’s predicament. Parents often appeared to be both sceptical of the value of 
home-school agreement but sympathetic towards the school in pursuance of its duty 
to enact a statutory obligation. One loyal mother reported that her children’s primary 
school was simply:  
…ticking the box… ticking boxes. That’s all they’re doing. Doing the 
bureaucratic thing the government say they have to do. In many ways they 
haven’t got time to sit up and say “I’m terribly sorry this is not the right thing 
for this school” because it takes so much more effort to do that. It’s a lot easier 
to tick the box and get it out the way. And that’s not because they necessarily 
want to do that, it’s just that changing something in that situation means 
taking time away from educating the child. Teachers don’t have time for that. 
(B-Par) 
The reasons parents gave for signing or not signing the agreement fell into four 
categories. Refusers objected to the idea of it per se, although the distinction between 
a ‘principled parent’ (one who refused to sign on principle) and a ‘difficult’ one (who 
might be cast as ‘irresponsible’) would be difficult for a school to assess without 
subsidiary information. Forgetters said they simply overlooked signing despite 
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reminders from school but for whom it was clearly an unimportant or irrelevant 
event. Active signatories were those parents who believed the home-school 
agreement to be worthy of support. And reluctant signatories describe those who 
disliked the procedure, or saw it as an unnecessary external imposition upon the 
school, and yet who took what one described as a ‘trivial’ stand (‘I choose my battles 
carefully’) by signing for fear of not being seen as a ‘good parent’ by the school or 
concerned that they may embarrass their child.  
 
Reluctant signatories were a particularly noteworthy group. Schools generally could 
not easily distinguish between reluctant and active signatories (both of whom ended 
up signing) or between noiseless refusers and forgetters (both of whom ended up not 
signing) nor had considered what implications this might have for home-school 
partnership. One school governor was clear that parents ‘have the right to say “I 
don’t want to sign this”… but I’ve no awareness of anyone… refusing to sign it’ (B-
GB). The headteacher of the same primary school was, however, more circumspect:  
They (parents) can refuse to sign it. I believe. Obviously it’s in our interests to 
know why. To be very very honest, in our school we’ve never had parents who 
have been unwilling to sign it… If one refused, our position would be that we’d 
need to talk it over with the parents to find out exactly what the issues were. 
(B-HT) 
Many parents remarked that there was both explicit and tacit pressure to comply and 
sign. This came home in the form of reminders, via School Newsletters or verbal 
prompts from the child, that were viewed as pressure to conform to what one called 
‘the good parent syndrome’ or the wish for the school to recognise the home as 
responsible: ‘So why did you sign? For support really... I can’t justify why’ (D-Par). 
Signing formed part of a flurry of activity at the start of the academic year, especially 
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as new groups of children started school in Reception (primary) or in Year 7 classes 
(secondary), and formed part of an initiation ceremony of entering the institution. A 
secondary governor suggested that it was often an automatic and unquestioned 
response to a request from the school to a mindless process that was performed by 
parents unreflectively: ‘Just another obligation placed on parents like their children 
turning up in uniform and turning up on time’ (D-GB). Often parents confirmed that 
they had signed because of ‘form overload’ at the start of term and ‘to get the paper 
work out the way’ (C-Par) or ‘for the sake of a signature’ (D-Par). When asked if the 
home-school agreement was not, therefore, taken very seriously one parent 
answered: ‘That’s right. A lot of parents would probably not pay attention to what 
was on the form and send it back. I have been guilty of that with the others at 
primary school’ (D-Par).  
 
Another of the reluctant signatories who still opted to sign despite qualms about the 
idea of the home-school agreement said: 
I don’t think it’s worth bothering about… dropping your…umm…you know… 
the child into it by not signing it. You obviously want to toe-the-line a bit on 
this one. It’s not worth putting pressure on… to rock the boat in the first few 
weeks of term. That to me seems like common sense anyway… That’s what I 
mean by it’s not worth worrying about. Because I wouldn’t want to use my 
children as my tool…to be one of those parents who says I don’t particularly 
want my child to do this, that or the other. I’d rather deal with it myself. (C-
Par) 
The same parent suggested that because places were limited and the school 
oversubscribed, home-school agreements had also been used as ‘a control 
mechanism’:  
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But who’s in control? I think the school. We’re oversubscribed. As I say, any 
student who doesn’t ‘toe-the-line’… they make it very clear that there are other 
people that would like to take their place’ (C-Par).  
Others said very much the same thing: ‘I think that… well… parents will sign because 
they want their children to come here so much’ (B-T). The few parents who actively 
refused to sign included a Chair of Governors who argued vociferously that the 
agreement was actually a list of expectations:  
I wouldn’t want to call it an agreement. It’s almost like a list of expectations … 
what’s expected… agreed expectations… It’s like making it seem really like a 
legal document and that you’re signing your name to it so that you’ll comply 
with it. It puts people like me off signing the thing, if you see what I mean. (A-
GB) 
And yet, despite her worries, she suggested that she had signed her older daughter’s 
agreement at secondary school because of pressure from the child. She differentiated 
her actions because as a governor she felt more secure in the relationship she had 
with her younger child’s primary school. It is a case that demonstrates well the 
delicate judgements parents make in refusing to sign in one context but not in 
another, or in choosing to sign the agreement with reluctance despite worries about 
its purpose and content. 
 
There are, then, a complex set of issues in tension that underlie the nature of 
parental compliance. A small number saw it as providing clarity for school 
procedures and providing expectations for them as parents, that may be connected 
with social class (see Vincent & Tomlinson, 1997; Gerwirtz, 2001). The majority, 
however, saw it as a tolerable or what one called an ‘inexpensive’ part of entry-
membership into a school they valued. Only a handful were decided non-signatories. 
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What is significant is that all the schools were unable to differentiate between 
reluctant and involved signatories both of whom signed, or between noiseless 
forgetters and animated behind-the-scene refusers who chose not to sign. This has 
implications for home-school relationships. Only the senior management in both the 
primary schools clearly indicated that they valued other less legalistic channels of 
communication so that they could assess the attitudes and reactions of wary or 
unhappy parents, a point to which we return. 
 
2.4. Pupils’ perspective 
 
Two related issues emerged from interviewing pupils. The first centres on the 
consequences of their non-involvement in the construction and revision of the 
agreement and the second upon the degree of pressure they felt to ratify it. One 
fifteen-year-old described it as ‘a one sided agreement in a way. We agree to do what 
the school wants us to do but they won’t let us do everything that we want in return’ 
(D-Pu). A seventeen-year-old similarly suggested that:  
Agreements are a bit unclear. It keeps coming up but… uniform! Sixth formers 
are supposed to dress ‘smartly’. But you can’t put down rules which actually 
say what is smart. One teacher interprets it one way… then another comes 
along. (D-Pu) 
One teacher called this the ‘fluffy’ problem, as we shall see, that encapsulates the 
problem of ambiguity and interpretative struggle regarding the meaning of what has 
supposedly been agreed. An issue here was the age and maturity of pupils. In one 
primary school a ten-year-old reflected back upon his time in Reception when he was 
not yet five and described the problem thus: 
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You sign it in Reception but now in Year 5 or Year 6 you read back and you 
think, well now… Now I’m this age I don’t actually want to sign it but you can’t 
really undo the signing… When you’re young most of it will seem UTTER 
gibberish. In Reception they don’t know what they’ve agreed to. (A-Pu) 
Teachers and parents of Reception-aged pupils in both primaries also saw the 
difficulty of asking children as young as four to sign:  
I don’t think that Bradley would have been able to write it. So… you know. He 
couldn’t write his name at four. (B-Par) 
I think at four, to be quite honest with you, they will sign it if they are asked to 
by their teacher… because children do what they’re told generally. (B-T) 
They’ll sign anything. But at four if asked to sign it by teachers they will do so. 
Not ‘forced’ to sign. But ‘will’. (B-T) 
For me, personally, it’s absolute nonsense. (B-T) 
A four year old’s signature? Looking at it as a contract… well let’s face it. The 
child will write that because an adult says to them ‘just do it’. (B-HT) 
So why get them to sign it?  
Yea I wonder that sometimes. Lots of them can’t write their name at that age. 
(A-T) 
At the other end of schooling one sixth-form tutor suggested that the insistence of a 
signature from a student could ‘jeopardise delicate relationships’ (C-T). Parents too 
were sensitive to the nature of pressure upon pupils from the school for conformity 
when the cost of not signing was ‘falling out with their tutor over something they’re 
going to have to do anyway’: 
From the perspective of a parent they can’t just be chucked out for not 
bringing the right equipment. But if you’re an eleven year old you’d be very 
worried if you hadn’t brought this (agreement) in. I’ve certainly bumped into 
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children who are in floods of tears because… you know… they’ve forgotten 
their pencil. They see this as some sort of a threat if they don’t sign it. (C-Par) 
 
In sum, while there is no legal obligation for pupils to sign there was evidence from 
the pupils themselves, as well as from parents and teachers, that there was pressure 
to do so. One headteacher reflecting upon the practice of securing signatures threw 
up her hands and declared, ‘Ohhh… for goodness sake! (laughter)’ (B-HT), 
acknowledging she felt under pressure to obtain evidence of agreement from her 
pupils but that at the same time considered she was taking advantage of their lack of 
understanding of what becoming a signatory meant. In secondary schools too there 
was general distrust of the process by pupils who felt under pressure to sign by the 
end of second week of first term and, despite a substantial proportion suggesting 
they had forgotten, the outcome appeared unmonitored or fairly inconsequential. 
One parent of a secondary-aged child believed that: ‘A lot of students will forge their 
parent’s signatures… A lot of these (agreements) will not actually come out of their 
bags’ (C-Par). 
 
2.5. Asymmetrical undercurrents 
 
What emerges from this synopsis of current practice is that while home-school 
agreements appear tripartite and equitable there is clear evidence to suggest that 
they are asymmetrically structured in both their assemblage and implementation. 
We have seen that it was common for headteachers or deputies to script the 
agreement and then pass it through the governing body for formal ratification. None 
of the agreements was recent (one was eleven years old) and since their inauguration 
had not been discussed by staff nor reconstructed with parents despite the 
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mandatory obligation so to do. In both primary schools, once home-school 
agreements were completed they were boxed and stored where they remained 
untouched. The annual negotiation between teachers and pupils of ‘classroom rules’ 
was said to supersede that which had been agreed, with one teacher admitting she 
manipulated the outcome:  
To quote you ‘I do twist things a bit’ and I just wonder if that would also 
apply to the formal agreement. So what’s its function? You say its function is 
to encode the school rules. Maybe those rules are set by teachers pretending 
negotiation then? 
I couldn’t possibly agree with that… 
…but for the record she’s smiling (mutual laughter) (B-T) 
One sixth-form pupil voiced his concern for the imbalance by suggesting the need for 
an ombudsman to enact the agreement: ‘If teachers failed their side of the agreement 
who would we turn to? We would need a person outside the school who’d have to be 
accessible’ (D-Pu). Asymmetry was also found in the semantic switching of 
‘agreement’ to it denoting ‘rules’: 
But then you’re surely implying that it’s a set of rules… But that’s not an 
‘agreement’? 
But it is an agreement if they agree to it. 
Is it therefore a one-way ‘agreement’? 
But if they didn’t agree with what’s on the paper they wouldn’t sign it. It’s like 
a ‘set of rules’ for behaviour for those entering the school. (B-T) 
In the comment by a headteacher below, her pronoun shift (‘I’ - ‘we’ - ‘us’) is 
revealing as is her slippage from ‘agreement’ to ‘contract’:  
From the parent’s point of view I would consider this more of a contract. 
There are parents we don’t see every day. There are parents that we don’t see 
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at all… Although it doesn’t have huge legal weight with regard to penalty… it’s 
something that is sort of a support to the school. To say “Well now, look, you 
did sign this”. I think that’s actually what you’re doing… You’re actually giving 
rules to parents. Saying that phrase is quite shocking but actually that’s what 
we are doing. You’re saying that to be part of this school community we need 
you to share our values and our vision and our… you know… what’s important 
to us. (B-HT) 
 
Asymmetry was found therefore not only in the procedures for the construction but 
also in the composition or content of promises made by each party. Schools reported 
no example of a parent using the agreement to challenge them for failure to deliver 
on a specific part of it. One parent said, because the wording made it so ambivalent 
and self-evident, ‘there’s not much they could argue about – ‘… “attend school 
regularly”, “bringing the right equipment”, “wear school uniform”, “tidy appearance”, 
and so on ’ (C-Par). Similarly, a governor talked of the lack of equivalence in the 
outcome for each party, such that one would never find a school agreeing to 
guarantee that a pupil reached a certain violin grade, acquire the requisite exam 
grades to enter university, or simply ensure that a child emerged from school literate 
and numerate: 
There is no guarantee that the school will ensure that the child is literate and 
numerate. And I have to say if a kid can’t do the basics after eleven years of 
schooling there is a huge issue within the education profession of a child 
whose needs are not being met.  
And if this requirement were itemised in the home-school agreement?  
I would be inundated with parents asking why John or Susan had not 
achieved a ‘C’ grade in English or achieved a grade 1 maths. They certainly 
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wouldn’t accept the appalling 50% of kids failing English and maths. It would 
make teachers accountable… makes the education system accountable. (C-GB) 
Keeping the parental part of the home-school agreement vague was important said 
one primary teacher. In principle, she could see that ‘they (parents) could use it. But 
it’s not phrased to allow this. It’s ‘fluffy’ for them… and, personally, you wouldn’t 
want it made too ‘un-fluffy’… (laughter)’ (B-T1).  
 
One outcome was that disciplinary action based upon the home-school agreement 
only ever emanated from the school to parents or pupils. One headteacher explained 
that she had twice referred parents to the signed agreement that formed a reference 
point to address their apparent misdemeanour: 
The second one was a stepfather…umm… who was very aggressive and 
threatening and so again we said: “Look, we’ve enclosed a copy of your home-
school agreement signed earlier this month by your partner that you will show 
respect for all members of the school community...” We highlighted that 
bit…and also said that, you know, before any future meeting we’d get him to 
sign a code of conduct. (A-HT) 
When asked post-interview what she would do if the parent hadn’t signed the 
agreement she said: ‘Probably show him the agreement and say something like “And 
we note you didn’t sign it”… (laughter)’ (A-HT).  
 
Issues of asymmetry coincide with the possible impact of the home-school agreement 
upon the fabric of school relationships. One of the conclusions from the 2003 survey 
was that a majority of respondents thought they ‘had no impact’ on schools (DfES, 
2003, p. 23). We have already seen that more recently OFSTED has also concluded 
that home-school agreements were not ‘driving the school’s work with parents and it 
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was seen by some as tokenistic’ (OFSTED, 2011, p. 8). This is borne out by the 
evidence above. However, that agreements are thought to have no impact is 
ambiguous. For some headteachers home-school agreements are clearly not 
permitted to impact upon the life of their school in the sense that they are side-lined 
as efficiently as possible: ‘The way it stands at the moment at school is that that piece 
of paper (the agreement) is signed and then that’s history… that piece of paper gets 
superseded by what we do in the classrooms’ (B-HT). The same head acknowledged, 
however, that the agreement had an impact. Because of the importance she placed 
upon relationships in school, that formed ‘a sort of agreement… a contract of trust’, 
she argued that it brought with it a sense of formal legality that ‘just muddied the 
water’ (B-HT) and put delicate relationships in jeopardy. A Chair of Governors, 
considering the impact of signage and the surrogate legal obligations that home-
school agreements represented, agonised about its effect upon trust, motivation and 
human responsibility. This he attributed to the political backdrop at the time of its 
emergence suggesting it had been ‘a very controlling era in social understanding’:  
My personal belief is that we shouldn’t get pupils to sign. This is highly hostile 
to relationships based on what is genuine rather than obliged. It doesn’t 
change inner motivation… Clearly, we need laws and restrictions to make a 
society function. We need rules of some kind. But I don’t think they function 
better because you make people sign things so they’ll do something… You’re 
no better off. If they agree to do it, but still didn’t like doing it, you haven’t 
changed their inner motivation anyway. Surely, what we’re seeking to do in a 
healthy institution is encourage better results, better behaviours, better 
motivations… Trust is fundamental. You have to give people the responsibility 
to get it wrong… We’ve have had a very controlling era in social 
understanding… Massive erosion of longstanding civil liberties, desperate 
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urge to lock everyone up, criminalise certain behaviours and to restrict 
people’s autonomy… The whole thing is made contractual and top down, 
which is a very alien notion of society to me. (D-GB) 
 
3. Habermas and juridification 
 
The agreement can be theorised in a number of ways. A Foucauldian analysis would 
see it in terms of the shaping and redistribution of power within schools seen as 
carceral institutions ‘swarming with disciplinary mechanisms’: ‘Thus the Christian 
school must not simply train docile children; it must also make possible to supervise 
the parents, to gain information as to their way of life, their resources, their piety, 
their morals’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 211; see also Foucault, 1988; 1990; Vincent & 
Tomlinson, 1997). As part of a technology for delivering a new form of regulatory 
management, agreements would then be read as part of the enactment of ‘modest, 
suspicious power’ in order to ‘normalise judgements’ (ibid., p. 177) where ‘toeing-the-
line’, as one parent put it, would be read as part of an abundance of humble 
modalities and micro-penalties that encouraged self-censure through fear of isolation 
or embarrassment for refusal to endorse that which had been (allegedly) agreed (see 
Ball, 2013, p. 51; Ball, 1990). Here the price of straying is conveyed through ‘petty 
humiliation’, carried through institutional ‘coldness, a certain indifference, a 
question’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 178), as well through more direct accusations of 
disloyalty or the threat of reprisal like the imposition of a code of conduct. A 
comparison of the content of home-school agreements with Prisoner Rule and 
Regulations display remarkably similar edicts and language (see Winder, 2012). 
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Habermas’s theory of juridification (Verrechtlichung), however, is less frequently 
applied in educational contexts and better explains the significance of the agreement 
in terms of the spread of surrogate-legal pronouncements and shifting cultural 
practices that currently augment law-based forms of social management. 
Juridification is the consequence of the expansion and the densification of formal 
law. The former describes the ‘legal regulation of new, hitherto informally regulated 
social matters’ and the latter ‘the specialized breakdown of global statements of the 
legally relevant facts into more detailed statements’ (Habermas, 2006, p. 357). It 
originates from two sources. First, through the requirement of capitalism to ensure 
the dependable regulation of business, something Weber had observed as part of the 
broader sweep of rationalisation in the industrial world, and second through political 
struggle that gave rise to ‘situational freedoms’ (Weber, 1930) or ‘freedom-
guaranteeing juridification’ (Habermas, 2006, p. 361) in areas like employment law. 
Habermas then couples juridification to the idea that as the economy and state 
become more complex they penetrate ever more deeply into the symbolic 
reproduction of communities that originate in the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). This is 
described as ‘the reservoir of taken-for-granteds, of unshaken convictions that 
participants in communication draw upon in cooperative processes of interpretation’ 
(ibid., p. 124), and constitutes the realm of tradition, custom and convention and is 
the sole source of norms and values. This differs fundamentally from systems media 
that are driven by instrumental rationality (see Gibson, 2011) and survey the world in 
terms of quantities, like money and votes. Significantly, because systems media tend 
to overwhelm or colonise the lifeworld, Habermas argues spheres of legitimacy-
generating ‘communicative interaction’ are displaced in the process. Colonisation 
describes the surging of instrumental rationality beyond the bounds of the economy 
and state bureaucracy into areas of communicatively structured life where it achieves 
22 
 
dominance ‘at the expense of moral-political and aesthetic-practical rationality’ 
(Habermas, 2006, p. 304-305). Colonisation, in other words, is a consequence of 
juridification and helps account for the withering of the lifeworld and the increasing 
marginalisation of ‘norm-conforming attitudes’: 
In modern societies, economic and bureaucratic spheres emerge in which 
social relations are regulated only via money and power. Norm-conforming 
attitudes and identity-forming social memberships are neither necessary nor 
possible in these spheres; they are made peripheral instead. (ibid., p. 154) 
 
Juridification also accounts for changes in the nature of formal law insofar as it 
straddles the lifeworld and system. This is because law, on the one hand, only gains 
social validity by having its legitimacy sourced by the lifeworld: ‘They need 
substantive justification, because they belong to the legitimate orders of the lifeworld 
itself and, together with informal norms of conduct, form the background of 
communicative action’ (ibid., p. 365). Law, on the other hand, operates as a coercive 
system with predictable and dependable procedures that stand apart from the 
content of particular value judgements. Law, in other words, makes claims to 
legitimacy and to legality. The problem today, says Habermas, is that when there is 
a weakening of the normative base upon which law is formed, substantive 
justification through communicative interaction is diminished and problems of 
legitimation arise (see Habermas, 1988). Not only are large swathes of ‘technicized 
and de-moralized’ (Habermas, 2006, p. 366) law relieved of the problem of 
legitimacy but legalism starts to supplant that which had hitherto been assumed to 
be un-formalised consensual social agreement. Ominously, warns Habermas, ‘the 
trend toward juridification of informally regulated spheres of the lifeworld is gaining 
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ground along a broad front’ (ibid., p. 368). Home-school agreements exemplify this 
trend and there are three reasons why. 
 
First: the spread of juridification in schools is greater than the mere rise of home-
school agreements. Today a plethora of laws extend from the legal requirement for 
schools and communities to be (quite literally) Working Together (DCSF, 2008; 
Education Act, 2002, section 176; Education Act, 2005, section 7), through to 
regulations that recognise a child’s rights against their school. Such legal 
requirements are evident in burgeoning procedures for Criminal Record Bureau 
checks, the right of parents to receive written reports and to have access to their 
children’s records, the legal surveillance of a school’s standards, as well as an 
abundance of health and safety law frequently ridiculed for generating ‘regulatory 
myths’ (HSE, 2013), like the banning of triangular-shaped flap jacks in schools (BBC 
News, 2013). Even the Prime Minister has acknowledged that the consequences of 
juridification in this domain are often bizarre and misguided:  
Something has gone seriously wrong with the spirit of health and safety in the 
past decade. When children are made to wear goggles by their headteacher to 
play conkers… What began as a noble intention to protect people from harm 
has mutated into a stultifying blanket of bureaucracy. (Cameron, 2009; see 
also Almond, 2013, p. 199) 
 
Second: While the PM does not extend his anxiety regarding juridification to the 
home-school agreement it too is part of the trend towards law-based forms of 
regulation in schools. While its legality is manifest, both in its statutory nature and 
in its adoption of a legal-contractual format, its legitimacy as we have seen is 
contested. Parents who found no validity in the agreement were concerned how their 
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reactions might be read by the school and so chose to negotiate their way past it 
inaudibly in an attempt to minimise risk to themselves or the embarrassment of their 
child. A governor who disapproved of the way ‘the whole thing is made contractual 
and top down’ condemned it for supposing ‘a very alien notion of society’. We heard a 
sixth form teacher suggest that if he were to enforce specific aspects of the agreement 
with his tutor group (like the requirement – ironically - for students ‘to have the 
agreement accessible to tutors at all times’) it would be counterproductive and 
‘jeopardise delicate relationships’. We learnt how some pupils reacted to one 
teacher’s judgement that agreements needed to be ‘fluffy’ (‘One teacher interprets it 
one way… then another comes along’) and heard of their solution, the need for an 
ombudsman to give a legal interpretation of what had supposedly been agreed. We 
also heard one headteacher protest that because the agreement mimicked a contract 
it ‘just muddied the water’ and endangered trust within her community. In short, 
there were many examples where pupils and parents signed an agreement they had 
not jointly constructed, were too young to understand, did not value or with which 
they disagreed.  
 
Third: This not only makes the legitimacy of agreements questionable but also 
endangers ‘norm-conforming attitudes and identity-forming social memberships’ 
(Habermas, 2006, p. 154). Because agreements do not supplement socially 
integrated contexts but escalate surrogate-legal arrangements between families and 
schools, they usher in new forms of relationships by converting them over to ‘the 
medium of law’ (ibid., p. 369). Currently schools are Janus-faced, looking toward 
their legal obligation to enact the agreement while surveying the deleterious effect 
this may have upon their community and beneath this tension lies a paradox. 
Agreements might (in part) be thought to protect pupils’ and parents’ by offering 
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them the right (in principle) to be included in decision-making and extend their 
rights against institutional negligence and malpractice. This provision might be 
thought to deliver clarity and protection through agreed and well-broadcasted 
disciplinary procedures and penalties, welfare directives on health and safety, and so 
on. On the other hand, many of these legal rights within current legislation would be 
won at the cost of increased bureaucratisation in which social membership would be 
broken down further into a mosaic of legally contestable administrative acts. Here 
relationships would become dependent upon litigation-proof procedural certainties 
underpinned by ‘depersonalization, inhibition of innovation, breakdown of 
responsibility, immobility, and so forth’ (ibid., p. 372-373) and that inhibit the 
legitimacy-generating activities of the lifeworld. In other words the paradox of 
agreements lies in the way they promise communicative action and situational 
freedoms while colonising relationships. 
 
4. Hobbes and contractualism  
 
Much of the discussion concerning juridification so far has made assumptions about 
the types of relationship implicit in agreements. We have seen one governor argue 
they were ‘highly hostile to relationships based on what is genuine rather than 
obliged’, that it is a view reminiscent of the problems commonly associated with 
Hobbes’s theory of self and association. It prompts us to question the assumption 
that human agreements are dependable only if underpinned by contract. In what 
follows, I elide subtle distinctions between contractarianism and contractualism 
because of space. 
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Hobbes published the Leviathan in 1651 shortly after the English civil war. In it 
reflected upon a hypothetical state of nature where people lived ‘in continual feare, 
and danger of violent death’, where he famously characterised ‘the life of man (a)s 
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short’ suggesting it was a state of war in which 
‘every man is enemy to every man’ held sway (Hobbes, 2008, p. 86). While he 
entertained the possibility that there might be mutual agreement amongst warring 
parties for self-interested gains, Hobbes’s position was that ‘covenants without the 
sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all’ (ibid., p. 116). In other 
words, agreements based on mutual consent and trust could not work because, 
although humans always acted in their own self-interest, they often failed to act 
rationally. Because of the predilection of human nature to be self-interested and 
brutal, a condition in which no one could be trusted to refrain from stealing or 
harming another, Hobbes was led to the conclusion that only in a civil society led by 
a powerful sovereign would there be peace. A leviathan was the product of that pact, 
brought into being by a social contract in which individual rights were exchanged for 
more dependable relationships and security.  
 
The limitations of Hobbes’ account of contract parallels apprehensions with its 
modern derivative, the home-school agreement. Not only do both rely upon cryptic 
signs of tacit consent with one-way directives that makes ‘consent quite like 
succumbing to force’ (Evers, 1977, p. 193), but some have argued that the 
preoccupation with contracts centres upon a particular characterisation of 
subjectivity that is taken to be universal:  
Hobbes’s analysis of human nature, from which his whole political theory is 
derived, is really an analysis of bourgeois man; that the assumptions, explicit 
and implicit, upon which his psychological conclusions depend are 
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assumptions peculiarly valid for bourgeois society. (Macpherson, 1973, p. 
239). 
In other words, Hobbes’s account of human nature that makes the need for a 
contract alluring is actually a characterisation of a type of person living at a time of 
nascent capitalism emerging in early-modern Europe. He thus presents an 
unpleasantly accurate account not of human nature as such but of ‘man’ during the 
rise of bourgeois society imbued with his proclivity for atomistic, self-seeking and 
mercantile activity. It is the person Held described in Feminist Morality (1993) as 
‘economic man’ who first and foremost maximised his own individually-considered 
interests and entered into contract to do so. It is the man of Weber’s Protestant Ethic 
who, with adjudicating and administering procedures at hand to establish the 
dependable regulation of business, rationalised his productivity. 
 
However, what this depiction of contract man fails to do is adequately represent the 
more subtle links that connect people. This is the place where non-obligatory trust 
and moral obligation reside. Hobbes’s model of contract cannot adequately represent 
the relationship, for example, between children and those who care for them, be they 
parents at home or teachers at school in loco parentis. Since such carers are mostly 
women (see Friend, 2004), Baier has argued that contractualism is actually a model 
of human interaction founded upon a specious view of human nature and typically 
created by men-philosophers. These she depicts historically as ‘a collection of gays, 
clerics, misogynists, and puritan bachelors’ (Baier, 1986, p. 248) who, in choosing to 
focus upon the cool, distanced relations between more-or-less free and equal adult 
strangers, ignored the web of trust that tie moral agents to one another in a 
multitude of infinitely complex and composite ways (see Hampton, 1993). 
Contractarians, she argues, are like ‘the members of an all-male club, with 
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membership rules and rules for dealing with rule breakers and where the form of 
cooperation [is] restricted to ensuring that each member c[an] read his Times in 
peace and have no one step on his gouty toes’ (ibid., p. 247-248). In essence, says 
Baier, ‘contract is a device for traders, entrepreneurs, and capitalists, not for 
children, servants, indentured wives and slaves’ (ibid., p. 247). 
 
Some would argue that modern society is caught in the grip of juridification and 
‘contractual thinking’ (see Held, 1993, p. 193). Its attraction lies in its explicitness 
and dependability, but the escalation of surrogate-legal arrangements between 
families and schools brings new forms of relationship where ‘rules and regulations’ 
apply. For example, in acceding to the home-school agreement parents at Beechwood 
Sacred Heart School are expected to accept ‘terms and conditions’ much as they 
would a computer software upgrade: ‘I/we have read the parents’ information 
booklet and I/we agree to all the terms and conditions stated or implicit in it’ 
(Beechwood Sacred Heart School, 2013). The inadequacy of contractual thinking lies 
in its disinclination to concern itself with non-explicit relationships that it fails to 
trust and whose actions it would supplant. These bypassed forms of trust and 
faithfulness are for Baier ‘the very basis of morality’ (Baier, 2004) that if made 
explicit and contractual would end up dissolving social capital further (see Putman, 
2000). In other words, education policy that brings contractual thinking from the 
periphery to the fore through home-school agreements jeopardises these affective, 
vulnerable and less formal relationships. 
 
5. Conclusion 
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In practice we have seen that schools get by and often deal with these dilemmas 
pragmatically. We have seen from interview data that primary schools frequently ask 
pupils as young as four to sign the agreement but do so by discharging their legal 
obligation through stealth and placidity to minimise that which they see as 
potentially damaging to their communities. While we have seen one headteacher 
refer to the home-school agreement as a reference point for disciplinary action in 
order to formalise proof of contravention by a parent, there is evidence in interview 
to suggest that others resist recourse to the agreement, such as when a child fails to 
arrive at school on time or in the appropriate uniform, for fear of the social cost of 
moving from communicative interaction and persuasion to more legalistic 
encounters. We have also seen that the agreement is clearly asymmetrical in its 
construction, composition and implementation and that there is evidence to suggest 
that the statutory requirement for schools to engage parents and pupils in the 
construction of it illusory but that their voice is faint despite policies that would 
enhance it. Whitty and Wisby have suggested that one of the reasons for this is that 
‘genuine provision for pupil voice requires some power and influence to be passed to 
pupils, at which point it becomes unpredictable’ (2007, p. 4). The unpredictability to 
which they refer is the epistemic uncertainly of where encounter may roam, a foible 
of un-policed argument and untrammelled communicative action that could lead to 
very different kinds of agreements. This presents a conundrum for the policy 
surrounding agreements. While it is clearly thought that pupils can and should learn 
through engagement with the skills, values and knowledge that would make 
encounter genuine, the content of the agreement would then be unpredictable for the 
outcome would not be known. However, if pupils (and parents) are deemed 
insufficiently knowledgeable or rational the edifice of voice and the enactment of 
human rights through consultation collapse. There is a tension, then, between 
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legislating for voice and reaching agreement while appearing to neuter it as a site of 
potential struggle (see Jessop, 2003, p. 160-161).  Presumably this is why 
interviewees gave no evidence of pupils or parents engaged in a process of 
negotiating the content of this ill-named agreement nor of using it to seek redress 
against a school, such that parents and pupils seemed destined to hallmark the 
knowledge-constitutive interests contained by them. Either that or they connived 
with schools to render the process sterile by engaging at levels that are predictable, 
sanitised and controllable (see Blair & Waddington, 1997). To suggest that home-
school agreements are merely ‘tokenistic’ (OFSTED, 2011) or have ‘had no impact’ 
(DfES, 2003, p. 8 & 23) is, therefore, misguided for they are symptomatic of the rise 
of legal-contractual relationships that symbolise a concerning decline in levels of 
trust within school communities: 
The point is to protect areas of life that are functionally dependent on social 
integration through values, norms, and consensus formation, to preserve 
them from falling prey to the systemic imperatives of economic and 
administrative subsystems growing with dynamics of their own, and to defend 
them from becoming converted over, through the steering medium of the law, 
to a principle of sociation that is, for them, dysfunctional. (Habermas, 2006, 
p. 371, 372-373; see also Gibson & Backus, 2011) 
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